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I. Introduction 
What does insurance have to do with the macroeconomic effects of 
fiscal policy? To an economist schooled in the traditional Keynesian 
multiplier analysis, the answer would be a resounding "nothing!" In the 
simplest Keynesian paradigm, the effects of fiscal policy are analyzed 
using the multiplier, which is based on a simple marginal propensity to 
conume, The role of uncertainty- -not to mention insurance- - is not at 
all apparent in this analysis. However, macroeconomics and the analysis 
of fiscal policy have progressed well beyond this simple framework. 
Consumption behavior continues to be stressed in analyzing the effects of 
fiscal policy, but the mechanisms chat are currently emphasized are quite 
different from chose in the early Keynesian framework, 
Most recent theoretical research on the effects of fiscal poLiy 
proceeds by examining the effects of fiscal policy on the consumption and 
portfolio decisions of individual consumers. The macroeconomic effects 
of fiscal policy are then determined by aggregating the behavior of 
individual consumers. If all consumers are identical, then, of course, 
aggregation is particularly simple. Alternatively, if, as in much of the 
research presented below, there is heterogeneity among consumers, then 
the aggregation of individual behavior must explicitly take account of 
general equilibrium considerations and market-clearing relations. 
The preferred frameworks for analyzing individual consumption 
behavior are the life-cycle model of Modigliani and Brumberg L22 and the 
permanent income model of Friedman l2J. Each of these approaches is 
based on explicit utility maximization by an individual consumer subject 
to the constraints that face that consumer. The important insight shared 
by these theories is that consumers form their consumption decisions on 
the basis of their lifetime income rather than simply their current 
income as in the Keynesian consumption function. Optimal consumption 
behavior requires consumers to forecast their future after-tax incomea. 
Therefore, in responding to a tax change, for example, consumers must 
forecast the future course of taxes as well as the current tax, Because 
future incomea and taxes are not perfectly predictable, there is a demand 
by tisk-averse consumers for insurance. The savings and consumption 
decisions of individual consumers will be greatly affected by whether 
insurance of various types is available and, if ao, at what price. In 
particular, the responses of individual consumers to various changes in 
taxea depend on the nature of available insurance arrangements. 
In discussing the importance of insurance arrangements, a broad 
definition of insurance will be used. For the purposes of this paper, 
insurance will he defined as amy contingent arrangement that allows 
individual consumers to mitigate random fluctuations in marginal utility. 
This definition ia deliberately general in order to convey the view that 
insights about insurance can be applied to questions that at first glance 
do not appear to have anything to do with insurance. 
The majority of this paper is devoted to situations in which 
individuals face idiosyncratic risks. More precisely, much of the 
analysis examines situations in which a group of individuals all face the 
aeme ex ante probability distribution for a random variable; but, cx 
post, different members of the group obtain different realizations of the 
random variable, If each individual's realization of this random 
variable were publicly obsenable, there would evidently be soope for 
private insurance markets to pool these idiosynoratio risks. By 
contrast, the last pert of this paper will ignore idiosyncratic risks and 
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will focus instead on aggregate risks, in which all members of a cohort 
experience the same realization of the random variable. In this 
situation, the scope for private insurance is less evident, but a fiscal 
authority could provide insurance. 
The particular risks analyzed in this paper are of three sorts. 
The first risk, which is discussed in section II, is associated with the 
fact that individuals do not know in advance exactly when they will die. 
After analyzing the implications of this individual longevity risk for 
individual saving and the distribution of wealth, this framework is used 
to analyze the effects of social security in the presence of alternative 
private insurance arrangements. The second risk, discussed in section 
III, is associated with the unpredictability of future income, and it 
gives rise to precautionary saving. An income tax provides a form of 
insurance against fluctuations in income and thus mitigates the need for 
precautionary saving. This interaction of the insurance aspects of the 
income tax and saving behavior has important implications for the effects 
of fiscal policy. The third risk, which is analyzed in section IV, is a 
cohort-wide income risk that cannot be shared in private insurance 
arrangements. However, a fiscal system of taxes and transfers can be 
established to share this risk optimally across generations. After 
presenting the features of an optimal system, the viability of such a 
- 
system is discussed. 
IL Longevity Risk 
Before analyzing the saving behavior of consumers in the presence 
of longevity risk, it is useful to summarize briefly the implications of 
the life-cycle model under the assumption that each consumer knows in 
advance how long he or she will live. The life-cycle model has two 
fundamental components. First, each individual cares about lifetime 
utility and, consequently, attempts to have a smooth profile of 
consumption over his or her lifetime. Second, there is a typical life- 
cycle pattern of income in which individuals earn labor income during 
early and middle adulthood and are retired in late adulthood. In order 
to qckieve the same level of consumption during retirement as during 
working years, it is necessary for individuals to save some of their 
labor income and accumulate wealth during their working years. Then chic 
wealth is gradually decumulated to provide for consumption during 
retirement, 
In a particularly restrictive form of the life-cycle model, 
consumers are assumed not to have bequest motives. In this formulation 
then, it is optimal for a consumer to end life with precisely zero 
wealth. However, this implication is simply not borne out by the data. 
While the implication that consumers die holding zoro wealth is perhaps 
too strong to be expected to hold exactly, many studies have indicated 
that consumers decumulate wealth far too slowly, or not at all. Does 
this failure of elderly consumers to decumulata their wealth indicate the 
importance of a bequest motive, does it indicate an imperfection in life 
and/or health insurance markets2, or does it indicate some more basic 
flaw in the model? Although this question is still waiting for a 
definitive answer, recent research, which has focussed on the role of 
insurance markets and bequest motives, has produced a rich array of 
1 See, for example, Kotlikoff and Summers [21). 
2 Davies [8] calibrated a theoretical model to actual mortality 
probabilities and comcluded that the uncertainty about one's date of 
death could potentially explain the failure of elderly consumers to 
dis save. 
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insights. 
A. Absence of Private Annuities 
To begin the study of saving and bequests under uncertain 
longevity, it is convenient to start with as simple a model as possible. 
This model is taken from Abel [1). A similar model of individual 
behavior, which does not include a capital stock, is analyzed in 
Eckstein, Eichenbaum and Peled [10). 
Suppose that each consumer can live for at most two periods. For 
the moment, assume that a consumer does not have a bequest motive and 
cannot buy life insurance or annuities. In the first period, the 
consumer receives an inheritance, I, and inelastically supplies one unit 
of labor thereby earning labor income Y. Also in the first period, the 
consumer pays a tax T and consumes an amount c. Therefore, the 
consumer's total wealth at the end of the first period of life, which is 
denoted by W, is 
W l+YTc (1) 
Suppose that this wealth is held in the form of riskless capital 
and let R denote the gross rate of return on wealth between the first anc 
second period. Thus, at the beginning of the second potential period of 
life, the consumer's wealth, including accrued interest, is R W. At the 
beginning of the second potential period of life, the consumer gives 
birth to C heirs. After the C heirs are born, the uncertainty about the 
consumer's longevity is resolved. With probability p. the consumer dies 
at the beginning of the second period and the consumer's estate is 
divided equally among the G heirs; thus each heir receives R W/G. 
Alternatively, with probability l-p, the consumer survives. Each 
surviving consumer receives a social security benefit S. Knowing that 
this is the last period of his or her life, the consumer consumes 
distriE 
his resources. Letting x denote the consumption in the second pe 
inherit 
life, it follows hat 
becsusE 
x RW±S R1I+Y-T-c)+S (2) 
Subs cit 
Equation (2) is the consumer's lifetime budget constraint 
consuirç 
next step is to specify the consumer's utility function. It is 
convenient to use the following special case of the Ysari (26] u 
function 
type 0 
U In c (I-c) D In x (3) 
where 0 < D < I is a discount factor representing the pure rate c 
preference. The utility of old age consumption is discounted hot 
consumi 
because of time preference and because of uncertainty. The weig 
inherit 
is the probability of aurvi'al. 
oonsumr 
To derive the optimal consumption in the first period, sub 
consume 
the budget constraint (2) into the utility function (3) so that I 
margins 
of expected lafetime 2tility depends only on consumption when yot 
Differentiating this expression with respect to c and setting th 
derivative equal to zero yields the optimal level of consumption 
wealth 
a [I Y - T + S/R] (4) 
by the 
where a l/(l+(I-p)D). The coefficient a, which is between zeH 
one, is the marginal propensity to consume out of lifetime resou 
Note that, in calculating the present of value of lifetime resou 
in (8) 
social security benefit S is discounted by the riskless rate of 
__________________________ 
type j 
3 The utility function in (3) can be interpreted as the expecte 
value of lifetime utility. Under this interpretation, it is imp inherit 
assumed in (3) that if the consumer dies at the beginning of the 
period, then second-period utility is equal to zero. More gener general 
could write (3) as U ln c + (l-p) D in x + p D where is th 
of second-period utility if the consumer dies young. For the pu inherit 
deriving the optimal behavior of the consumer, the value of i 
irrelevant, was a I 
received by a type j consumer is 
ii) - R W3/G (10) 
Equation (10) relates the inheritance of a type j consumer to the 
wealth of a type j-l consumer. Using this relation to substitute for the 
inheritance in (9) yields 
+ (1-a) R (11) 
-Equation (11) can be used to solve for the wealth of all consumers. 
Technically, it is a first-order linear constant coefficient difference 
equation with the boundary condition given by (7). This equation can be 
easily solved. It can be shown that the wealth of a young type j 
consumer, increases monoconically in j and, if (l-a)R/C < 1, it 
approaches a finite limit as j approaches infinity. Rather than present 
the complete solution here4, it is convenient to focus on the average 
value of in the steady state, which is denoted as W*. It can be 
shown that 
0/[l-(l-a)pR/Gj (12) 
The variable W* is an interesting macroeconomic quantity; in 
particular, it is the per capita value of the private capital stock2 To 
see that W* is the per capita stock of private capital, recall that 
surviving old consumers consume all of their resources. Thus, all 
private saving in the economy is done by young consumers. Since capital 
is the only asset in this economy, the saving of young consumers, which 
averages W* per capita, is equal to the private capital stock. 
This simple model endogenously generates a cross-sectional 
distribution of wealth. The mechanism generating the cross-sectional 
4 See Abel [1J for a complete solution. 
5 Strictly speaking, W* is equal to the total private capital stock of 
the economy divided by the number of young consumers, rather than divided 
by the total number of consumers. 
variation is that a fraction p of each cohort of consumers dies young and 
thus leaves accidental bequests to their heirs, in this model, all of 
tha cross-sectional variation in wealth results from cross-sectional 
variation in bequests. An additional feature of this model ia that it 
predicts a potentially aubstantial ratio of bequests to total private 
wealth. Indeed, since a fraction p of esoh type of consumer diea young, 
the ratio of bequests to total private wealth is equal to p. 
Fully Funded Social Seturi Although the model presented above 
is quite simple, it provides some important insights into the effects of 
a social insurance program. In particular, this model can he used to 
examine the effects on consumption, capital accumulation and the 
distribution of wealth of either a fully funded or a pay-as-you-go social 
security system. 
First, consider the effects of a fully funded social security 
system. In such a system, the government collects a tax T from each 
young consumer and investa the proceeds in capital. In the next period, 
the social ascurity fund is worth FT and is distributed evenly to the 
surviving members of the cohort of elderly consumers. Thus, each 
surviving consumer receives a social security payment S such that 
FT (l-p)S (13) 
The effects of the introduction of social security can be evaluated 
by comparing the equilibrium values of variables under the social 
security system with the values that these variables would attain in the 
absence of social security (with T S 0). The consumption of type 0 
consumers can be calculated by substituting the relation between the 
social security parameters S and T in (13) into (6) to obtain 
c0 - a (Y + pT/(1—p)} (14) 
Inspection of (14) reveals that the introduction of fully funded 
social security increases the consumption of young type 0 consumers by 
apT/(l-p). This increase in consumption reflects the intra-cohort risk 
pooling of the social security system. Each consumer contributes 1' to 
the social security system, but a fraction p of each cohort dies young 
and thereby surrenders its claim to social security benefits to the 
remiing fraction 1-p of the cohort. Thus, risk pooling increases the 
present value of lifetime resources of each survivor by pT/(l-p). 
Multiplying this increase in lifetime resources by the marginal 
propensity to consume, a, yields the increase in consumption of young 
type 0 consumers 
The wealth held by young type 0 consumers can be calculated by 
substituting the relation between the social security parameters S ann T 
from (13) into equation (7) to obtain 
— (l-a)Y - T - a p T/(l-p) (15) 
The introduction of fully funded social security reduces the wealth 
held by young type 0 consumers, and this reduction in wealth is 
decomposed into two parts in (15). First, even if a young type 0 
consumer maintained consumption unchanged with the introduction of social 
security, the consumer's wealth would decline by the amount of the soca1 
security tax, because first-period disposable income is reduced by T. 
Furthermore, as explained above, a young type 0 consumer increases 
consumption by apT/(l-p), which reduces saving by an additional apT/(l- 
Because the saving of young type 0 consumers is reduced by the 
introduction of fully funded social security, those type 0 consumers who 
die young leave smaller bequests in the presence of social security than 
12 
in its absence. Therefore, the introduttion of social security reduces 
the inheritances received by type 1 consumers. These consumers in turn 
leave ameller bequests in the presence of social security than in its 
absence, Indeed, in the new steady state the accidental bequest left by 
each type j consumer is reduced by the introduction of social security. 
Therefore, the introduction of social security reduces the inheritances 
received by all consumers (except for type 0 consumers who receive no 
inheritance in either case). Because the only source of cross-sectional 
variation is the intra-cohort variation in inheritances, it follows that 
fully funded social security narrows the steady state distributions of 
consumption and wealth.6 In addition to reducing the intra-cohort 
variation in wealth, the introduction of fully funded social security 
affects the average level of wealth in the economy and the size of the 
national capital stock, The national capital stock (per young person), 
K, is equal to the sum of the private capital stock, W*, and the capital 
held by the social security system, T. Recalling from (12) that the 
private capitol atock is proportional to and recalling that the 
introduction of social security reduces the value of WW), it follows 
that the introduction of social security reduces the private capital 
stock, Moreover, it can be shown that the reduction in the private 
capital stock, W*, is greater than T. Therefore, the national capital 
stock, K* W* + T, declines in response to the introduction of social 
security. 
The effect of social security on the average level of consumption 
6 Chu [7] extends this model to make the rate of return on capital and 
labor income endogenous. He further modifies the model to make social 
security taxes proportional to labor income and shows that linking the 
social security tax to income leads to different results about the 
distribution of wealth. 
can be calculated using the national income identity. To derive this 
identity, let Nt denote the number of young consumers born in period t. 
The assumption that each consumer has G children implies that Nt — GNi. 
Cross national product in period t is equal to the labor income of young 
consumers, NtY, plus gross capital income, R ?ç1(W*±T).7 Cross national 
product is allocated to consumption and saving. Total consumption is 
equal-to the consumption of the young consumers, Ntc*, plus the 
consumption of the surviving old consumers, (lp)N1x*. Gross national 
saving is equal to the saving of the young consumers, pius the 
gross saving of the social security system, N,,T Equating the sources 
and uses of gross national product yields 
NtY + R Nt 1(W*+T) — Nc* + (l-p)N 1x* + N(W*+T) (16) 
Equation (16) simply tate5 that gross national product is equal to 
consumption plus gross investment. Dividing both sides of (16) by Nt and 
recalling that Nt/Nti C and K* W* + T yields 
c* + (l-p)/C3 x* y + [R/C - 13 K* (17y 
The left hand side of (l7 is aggregate consumption per capita. 
7 The definitions of gross national product, gross capital income, gross 
national saving and gross investment used here differ somewhat from those 
dsed in the national income accounts. Recall that one unit of capital in 
period t yields R units of the consumption good in period t+l. Using 
more standard terminology, R is equal to 1 - d ÷ r where d is the rate of 
depreciation and r is the rate of return on capital before subtratting 
depreciation, With this notation, gross national product in period t is 
+ rN 1(W* + T); gross capital income is rNti(W*+T); gross 
investment, which is net investment plus depreciation, is N(W*+T) 
Nrl(w*+T) tl(w*+T); gross saving of the young generation is 
and gross saving of the old generation, which is net saving plus 
depreciation, is (lp)Ntix* + d(l-p)N51W*, In the special case of 
complete depreciation, d 1 and therefore R r. In this case, gross 
national product is NtY + tl(W* + T); gross capital income is 
ti(T*+T) gross investment is Nt(W*+T); gross saving of the young 
generation is NtW*; and gross saving of the old generation is zero, Thus 
in the case of complete depreciation, the concepts of the gross nationai 
product, gross capital income, gross national saving and gross investment 
used in the text correspond to the standard national income accounting 
definitions. 
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Recall that the introduction of fully funded social security leads to a 
reduction in the national capital stock, K*, on the right hand side of 
(17). If the rate of interest exceeds the population growth rate, rhen 
R/G - I is positive and the reduction in K* implies a reduction in 
consumption per capita. Alternatively, if the interest rate is less chan 
the population growth rate, then R/G I is negative and the reduction in 
the national capital stock K* implies an increase in consumption per 
capita. 
The relation between aggregate consumption and the aggregate 
capital stock in (17) is related to Phelps's 1,23) famous Golden Rule 
result. In order to maintain a constant level of capital per capita, it 
is necessary that the capital stock grow at the same rate that population 
grows. Thus, if the level of capital per capita is to be increased 
permsnently by one unit, then the level of gross investment in each 
period must be increased by C units per capita. The benefit of 
increasing the capital stock by one unit per capita is that gross capital 
income is increased by R units per capita. If R is greater than C, then 
the increased capital stock will increase steady state consumption; 
whether the economy should temporarily decrease consumption in order to 
accumulate capital and increase long-run consumption depends on society's 
preferences for present consumption relative to future consumption. 
Alternatively, if R is less than C, then steady state consumption can be 
increased by a decrease in the capital stock. There is no tradeoff 
between current and future consumption in this case. An increase in 
current consumption will reduce the capital stock and increase future 
consumption. Clearly, if an economy is ever in the case with R < C, it 
should decrease its capital stock; this would increase consumption at all 
dates, which would be Pareto-improving.8 
The case in which R is equal to G receives special attention. In a 
model with a neoclassical production function, the rate of return on 
capital, R, is a strictly decreasing function of the capital stock; 
hence, there is a unique value of the capital stock for which R — C. 
This value of the capital stock is called the Golden Rule capital stock 
The lden Rule capital stock is the capital stock that maximizes the 
permanently sustainable level of consumption. Any capital stock greater 
than the Golden Rule capital stock is too large in the sense described 
above, because R would be less than C. 
Pay-as-you-go Social Securitii A pay-as-you-go social security 
system differs from a fully funded system in that the social security 
system does not hold any capital under a pay-as-you-go system, the taxes 
collected from the young consumers are used to pay the benefits to the 
old consumers in the same period. In each period, the young cohort is 
G/(l-p) times as large as the su1iving old cohort. Therefore, setting 
total tax collections from yoing consumers equal to the total benefits 
paid to the old consumers yields the following relation between the 
social security parameters S and T 
GT — (l-p)S (18) 
The consumption of young type 0 consumers is calculated by 
substituting (18) into (6) to obtain 
- aY + al - (l-p)R/G] (S/R) (19) 
Equation (19) indicates that the consumption of young type 0 
consumers may either increase or decrease with the introduction of pay- 
as-you-go social security, depending on whether G exceeds or falls short 
8 See Diamond {9] for a demonstration that a competitive economy may end 
up with an inefficient overaccumulation of capital. 
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of (l-p)R. This result is to be contrasted with the finding that fully 
funded social security unambiguously increases c° To understand this 
difference, one can view the social security tax T as the price paid for 
a contingent claim that pays S if the consumer lives for two periods. 
The gross rate of return on this claim is S/T. If this gross rate of 
return, S/T, exceeds the rste of return available on the consumer's 
portfelio, R, then the introduction of social security will effectively 
make the consumer richer and will increase consumption. However, if the 
rate of return on social security falls short of the rate of return on 
the consumer's portfolio, then the introduction of social security will 
reduce the consumption of young type 0 consumers. Now obsene from (13) 
that the rate of return on fully funded social security, S/T, is equal to 
R/(l-p) which exceeds R if p > 0. Thus, fully funded social security 
leads to an increase in Alternatively, (18) implies that the rate 
of return on pay-as-you-go social security, S/T, is equal to G/(l-p) 
which may be greater than, less then, or equal to R. Therefore, pay-as- 
you-go social security may lead to en increase, decrease, or no change in 
Although the introduction of pay-as-you-go social security may 
either raise or lower (0), inspection of (7) reveals immediately that it 
unambiguouly reduces the saving of young type 0 consumers, w(0) As with 
fully funded social security, the reduction in implies that the 
inheritance received by each type j consumer (j > 0) is reduced. Again, 
the reduction in all nonzero inheritances implies that the cross- 
sectionel variation in wealth is reduced. Also, the reduction in 
agein implies that the per capita value of private weelth, W*, is reduced 
by the introduction of social security. Under pay-es-you-go social 
16 
security, the government does not hold any capital; the national capital 
stock is equal to the private capital stock. Because pay-as-you-go 
social security reduces the private capital stock, W*, it also reduces 
the national capital stock. Again (17) indicates that consumption per 
capita will fall if the interest rate, R, exceeds the population growth 
rate, G, but will increase if R is less than C. 
-B. Annuities 
The model presented above has yielded some important insights about 
the behavior of individual and aggregate saving, and about the effects of 
social insurance, in the presence of uncertain individual longevity. 
However, the model has at least two unsatisfactory implications. First, 
because consumers are assumed to be selfish, they would choose to hold 
all of their wealth in annuities, even if the annuities were not 
actuarially fair. Provided that an annuity pays a greater return than 
riskless capital in the event the consumer survives, the consumer would 
choose to fully snnuitize his or her wealth. Thus, there is an incipient 
demand for annuities, and a satifactory treatment would either include 
annuities or would provide an economic reason why there are no annuities 
in equilibrium. The model presented above simply rules out annuities by 
assumption. However, annuities will be introduced into the analysis 
below. 
The second unsatisfactory feature of the model is that the children 
of the richest consumers are among the poorest members of the economy if 
their rich, but selfish, parents live for two periods and thus leave no 
bequest. In this model, the only channel for the preservation of a 
family's wealth across generations is through accidental bequests which 
occur with early death. This feature of the model can be eliminated by 
17 
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introducing a bequest motive, In order to be able to focus first on the 
implications of an annuity market, the introduction of the bequest motive 
will be delayed until section C. 
Now suppose that there is a competitive market for annuities.9 
Each dollar invested by a young consumer in an annuity yields Q dollars 
in the following period if the consumer auives; the consumer's estate 
recaivea nothing if the consumer dies after only one period of life. 
Insurance companies sell these annuities end invest the proceeds in 
riakless capital which pays a gross rate of return R. In the following 
period, insurance companies distribute the premiums with accrued interest 
to the aurliving annuitanta in proportion to their contributions when 
young. The gross rate of return earned by aurvivora is equal to R/(l-p). 
The introduction of a competitive annuity market into the model 
dramatically alters the nature of the equilibrium and the effects of 
social security. Because R/(l-p) exceeds R, annuities dominate riskleaa 
capital and all consumers would choose to hold all of their wealth in the 
form of annuities. Therefore there would he no bequests--accidental or 
otherwiae, Hence, there would be no cross-sectional variation in wealth. 
In this situation, it is appropriate to uae a "representative consumer" 
model, 
In the presence of an annuity market offering a gross rate of 
return Q, the consumption of a representative old consumer, x. is 
x QW+S Q[Y-T-c]+S (20) 
The optimal level of consumption when young can be calculated by 
9 Kotlikoff and Spivak [20] discuss the role of the family in helping to 
provide annuities. The annuity protection offered by family members is 
not, of course, as complete as the insurance available in competitive 
annuity markets, Nevertheless, this annuity protection does affect 
consumer behavior. 
substituting the lifetime budget constraint (20) into the utility 
function (3) and then differentiating the resulting expression with 
respect to c. Setting this derivative equal to zero yields 
c a [Y - T + S/QJ (21) 
where, as earlier, the marginal propensity to consume, a, is equal to 
l/[l+(l-p)DJ. Equation (21) states that the consumption of a young 
coner is proportional to the present value of lifetime resources 
where the future social security benefit, S, is discounted by the 
actuarial rate of return Q. Alternatively, recalling that in a 
competitive annuity market Q R/(1-p), the consumption function in (21) 
can be written as 
c a [Y - T + (l-p)S/R1 (22) 
The consumption function in (22) indicates that in the presence of 
a competitive annuity market, the appropriate concept of lifetime income 
is the expected present value of income. 
FNflded Social Security: Now consider the effects of 
introducing a fully funded social security system as characterized by 
(13). Substituting the social security parameters from (13) into the 
consumption function (22) yields 
c aY (23) 
Equation (23), which presents the optimal level of consumption of a 
young consumer in the presence of a fully funded social security system, 
displays a remarkable result. This equation indicates that the optimal 
level of c is independent of the values of the social security parameters 
T and S. Thus, the optimal level of c is invariant to the introduction 
of fully funded social security. 
The reason for the irrelevance of social security in the presence 
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of a competitive annuity market is that fully funded social security 
simply provides consumers with a redundant asset. As stated earlier, 
a 
consumer's claim to the social security benefit S can be viewed as an 
asset with a gross race of return equal to S/T. Under fully funded 
social security, this rate of return is equal to R/(l-p), which is 
precisely equal to the rate of return on privately available annuities. 
Thux, zhile the social security system essentially forces young consumers 
to purchase an annuity. the consumers cen exactly offset this effect by 
reducing their holdings of neivate annuities by an equal amount, Because 
the payoff characteristics of the private annuity are identical to those 
of social security, the consumer can obtsin exactly the same state- 
contingent stream of consumption after the introduction of social 
security that could be obtained before its introduction. Furthermore, it 
will be optimal for the consumer to offset the effect of social security, 
beceuse the initial state-contingent consumption plan was optimal. Since 
the introduction of fully funded social security doee not change any 
relative price and does not change the consumer's opportunity set in any 
way, the original optimal plan remains optimal. 
The irrelevance of fully funded social security in the presence of 
a competitive annuity market is an example of a more general phenomenon 
that is knom as the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem. Briefly, the 
Ricardimn Equivalence Theorem states that chsnges in the timing of lump- 
sum taxes, holding constant the path of government spending, have no 
effect on the allocation of consumption. The reason is essentially that 
consumers can, and will, offset the effects of such changes by adjusting 
their savings and/or bequest behavior. 
As shown above, the Ricardien Equivalence Theorem applies to fully 
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funded social security in the presence of an actuarially fair private 
annuity market. However, there are at least two sources of departure 
from the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem in the case of fully funded social 
security. First, it should be noted the invariance of consumption to the 
introduction of fully funded socical security is a direct consequence of 
the fact that the rate of return on social security is exactly the same 
as the rate of return on private annuities, If, for some reason, the 
rates of return on private annuites and social security were not 
identical, then the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem would not hold. For 
example, if the rate of return on social security exceeded the rate of 
return on private annuities, then the introduction of social security 
would increase the expected present value of lifetime income and would 
iead to an increase in the consumption of young consumers° Of course, 
the question then arises as to why the government would be able to offer 
a higher rate of return on annuities than the private sector could. It 
would appear to be difficult the make the case that the government is 
more efficient in providing annuities, and it would also appear to be 
difficult to make the opposite case, a priori. An alternative 
explanation, which is discussed below, s that if consumers face 
different mortality risks, and have private information about these 
risks, then the private annuity market would be subject to adverse 
selection. However, the government could, by requiring a compulsory 
level of social security coverage, be immune to adverse selection and 
thus offer a higher rate of return. 
A second reason why the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem may not hold 
10 Karni and Zilcha {l7} examine the effect of social security in the 
presence of unfair annuity and life insurance markets in a model that 
includes a bequest motive. 
is that if the social security tax is large enough, the consumer .rev ncr 
he abe to offset it ccmpletely. Equivalently, a large social secucity 
ta:o nay fcrcc the censumer to hold mcre of the publicly prov dad annuity 
than Ic o" she wculd ha-ir held of he private annuity. Thcrefcce, tue 
ccnsuner .ccul-' not be able to offset completely the effect of the 
publicly provided nnrvitv by reducing private annuity holdings; 'he 
conrvmer we cimply rot 'lsnning to hold that much wealth in private 
annuities, Formafly th:a argument can be stated by obaervinf that rho 
private raring of e -csog cenauzser Y 'I - c, in view of the 
eptinel level of ccnc'u"yicn rn (23; the optimal level of pcsvst caving 
of e young consuma' le 
W (I-c) Y T (24) 
Provided that T is less than (l-a)Y, the consumer could offset the 
effecs of social seouriti by reducing the h Lding of prirate ennuitiea 
by P". However, if T is greeter than (I-a'?, then in crdcr tr irsirtain 
the otigit.mlly planned fl- ci of ronsunpti',r. ch. a vould baum to 
held a negative amo" -r of annuities A nsps7: / / ding of ennuitier 
could be achieumd ii the crnummer could butrum tesources and repay the 
debt if he or abe survives but have the debt cancelled if he or abe dies. 
The actuarially fair rste of return on such loans would be Q R/(l-p). 
The Ricardian Ec,uivalence Theorem would helu if the consumer could borrow 
at the aetua.isl'y faIr rate Q. However, if the consumer were unable to 
borrow (perhaps because the social security benefit is legally prohibited 
from serving as -TAsterml' then the Ricardisn Equivalance Theorem would 
fall to hold if P is greater than (1-a)?. In this case, social security 
would reduce the consumption of young consumera. 
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Pay-as-yougo Social Security Although a fully funded social 
security system is ineffectual in the presence of a competitive annuity 
market, this is not true, in general, for a pay-as-you-go system. To 
determine the optimal level of consumption under pay-as-you-go social 
security, substitute the social security parameters from (18) into the 
consumption function (22) to obtain 
— a Y + a [G/R - I] T (25) 
If the rate of interest exceeds the population growth rate, then 
C/R - 1 is negative and the introduction of social security leads to a 
reduction in consumption of young consumers, The reason for this 
reduction is quite clear. The rate of return on pay-as-you-go social 
security, S/T, is equal to G/(l-p) and the rate of return on private 
annuities is R/(l-p). Thus, if R > G, then the introduction of social 
security forces young consumers to hold annuities with a lower rate of 
return than is available in the private market. Therefore, consumers are 
made poorer by the introduction of social security and they reduce their 
consumption. 
If the rate of interest is less than the population growth rate, 
then G/R - 1 is positive and the introduction of social security 
increases consumption. Furthermore, the introduction of social security 
is Pareto-improving in this case. In the period in which pay-as-you-go 
social security is introduced, the members of the old generation are 
clearly better off because they receive the social security benefit S 
without ever having had to pay social security taxes. In addition, each 
subsequent generation is made better off by the introduction of social 
security because it provides them with an annuity that dominates the 
11 See Hubbard and Judd l6] for a more complete discussion of the 
effects of social security in the presence of borrowing constraints. 
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annuity available in the private market. The fact that the introducticn 
of social security is ParetoJmproving indicates that the initial 
equilibrium was not Psretoefficient. Indeed, the Golden Rule results 
discussed above indicate that if R < C, and if the capital stock ia 
positive, then- the economy suffers from an inefficient overattuisulation 
of capital. As applied to pay-asyou-go social security when R < C, the 
Coldga Rule result indicates that any increase in T and S is Pareto- 
improving until private saving by young consumers is driven to zero (or, 
with a neoclassical production function, until R is equal to C). 
Beruestotive 
me preceding analysis introduced annuities but hss the shortcoming 
that there are no bequests in the model. As a consequence, the 
distribution of wealth is degenerate. In order to generste bequests in a 
model with a competitive annuity market, a bequest motive is introduced 
in this section, The two most common formulations of the bequest motive 
are altruism and the joy-of-giving. Although these specifications are 
similar in many respects, they have different implications for the 
validity of the Ricardisn Equivalence Theorem and the efficscy of fiscal 
policy. 
Altruism: The altruistic specification of the bequest motive 
became popular in macroeconomics after Eerro's [4) presentation of the 
Ricardian Equivalence Theorem. Under an altruistic specification of the 
bequest motive, a consumer obtains utility from the utility of his heirs 
as well as from his own consumption. Consider a consumer born in period 
t who consumes c0 in period t and, contingent on survival, consumes 
in period t+l. Let Vt denote the total utility of this consumer and let 
Vt+l denote the total utility of his or her representative heir, who is 
born in period t+i. Suppose that the consumer's utility function is 
Vt in c + (i-p)D in + Et(Vt+i} (26) 
where EtC ) denotes the expectation conditional on information in period 
t. The parameter , which is assumed to lie between zero and one, 
measures the strength of the altruistic bequest motive. 
The utility of an altruistic consumer depends on his or her 
chiJdren's utility, which in turn depends on their children's utility, 
and so on. Thus, the utility of a consumer depends on the entire stream 
of consumption over his or her own lifetime and over the lifetimes of 
all of his or her descendents, Formally, the recursive specification of 
altruistic preferences in (26) is a linear difference equation that is 
satisfied by the following infinite-horizon utility function12 
Vt zE0(3rln c+ + (i-p)Dln xc÷i+j)} (27) 
1—0 
Now consider the effects of social security in the presence of an 
altruistic bequest motive, it is easiest to begin with the case in which 
all consumers live for two periods with certainty (formally p 0). 
First, consider a fully funded social security system in which RT S. 
As in the case without a bequest motive, fully funded social security 
will have absolutely no effect. In response to the introduction of fully 
funded social security, young consumers will maintain their original 
levels of consumption and will simply reduce their private saving by F. 
in the following period, when they are old, their portfolios of private 
assets will be worth RT less than in the absence of social security, but 
they will receive a social security benefit of S — RT that allows them to 
12 Douglas Gale [13, pp. 55-61] has emphasized that equation (27) is 
only one of an infinity of solutions to the difference equation in (26). 
However, (27) is the specification that is generally used in the 
literature. 
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maintain the original level of old-age consumption. 
Now consider the introduction of psy-as-you-go social security in 
which S CT. Under altruistic preferences, it turns out chat this 
policy also has no effect. The old consumers who are alive in the period 
in which social security is introduced will receive a payment of S but 
they will not increase their consumption at all. Instead, they will 
chogse to increase their bequest to each of their heirs by S/C. This 
increased inheritance exactly offsets the tax burden T levied on each of 
the young consumers, Thus, all young and old consumers are able to 
maintain the original levels of consumption. Because all relative prices 
and marginal rates of substitution remain unchanged, there is no 
incentive for anyone to change consumption. 
The discussion above demonstrates that in the absence of longevity 
risk and with altruistic preferences, the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem 
holds both for fully funded social security and for pay-as-you-go social 
security. That is. private consumption is invsriantto the introduction 
of social security whether it is fully funded or pay-as-you-go. When 
longevity risk is re-introduced into the model, the Ricardian Equivalence 
Theorem does not hold quite so generally. It doer continue to hold for 
fully funded social security. Because the rate of return on fully funded 
social security, S/T, is equal to the rate of return on private 
annuities. R/(l-p). young consumers respond to the introduction of social 
security by reducing their holding of private annuities by T; they 
maintain their consumption unchanged. 
The effects of pay-as-you-go social security in the presence of 
longevity risk and altruistic preferences are more interesting. Consider 
the period in which the pay-as-you-go social security system is 
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introduced, All surviving old consumers receive a social security 
benefit S * GT/(l-p). However, because a fraction 1-p of families have a 
surviving old consumer and the remaining fraction p of the families do 
not have a surviving old consumer, this payment to surviving old 
consumers induces a redistribution of wealth across families. In 
particular, there is a redistribution from families without a surviving 
old &nsumer to families with a surviving old consumer Each surviving 
old consumer will see that the present value of his or her family's 
resources is increased by the introduction of social security. 
Therefore, surviving old consumers will increase their own consumption 
somewhat and will also increase their bequests somewhat in order to share 
.he increase in wealth with subsequent generations. By contrast, the 
young consumers in families without survivors will see a decrease in 
their families' wealth and they will reduce their own consumption and 
their bequests. 
The argument above indicates that the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem 
fails to apply to pay-as-you-go social security under longevity risk, 
even if consumers have altruistic bequest motives. However, a staunch 
defender of the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem would not concede the case 
so quickly. A defense of the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem would argue 
that the analysis in the paragraph above has ignored a relevant insurance 
market. (ore precisely, if the introduction of social security was at 
least conceivable in the prior period, then each young consumer would 
have taken steps to guard against the risk of having social security 
introduced during a period in which there were no surviving old consumers 
in his or her family. Each young consumer in the previous period would 
have agreed to give up any social security benefit, S, received in the 
subsequent period in exobsnge for (l-p)S to be psid ro the consumer, or 
his estate, in the following period. If this sort of tax liability 
insurance arrangeaont wets in foroe, then the introduction of pay-as-you- 
go social security would have no effeot on the allocation of privete 
consumption. Although this argument is theoretically sound, it will 
undoubtedly strike aany readers as far-fetched. This type of insurance 
arrangement is not typically observed in practice, either because of 
legal prohibitions on trading future social security benefits or because 
of the liaited ability and/or willingness of consumers to anticipoto and 
write contracts for oIl conceivable contingencies. 
2of-oivno: The altruistic specification of the bequest cotive 
often implies that individual consumers will take actions to completely 
nullify the effects of various lump-sum tax and transfer policies. An 
alternative specification of the bequest motive is the joy-of-giving. 
Under the joy-of-giving, consumers obtain utility from their own 
consumption and from leaving a bequest, The utility from leaving the 
bequest depends only on the size of the bequest; it does not depend on 
the utility or consumotion of the recipients of the hequest. An example 
of a utility function that displays a joy-of-giving bequest motive is 
In c (l-p) U In x1 + pH(BD) + (l-p)H(88t) (28) 
where is the bequest if the consumer dies sfter one period, and 
is the bequest if the consumer survives for two periods. Under the 
specification in (28) , the utility from leaving a bequest of size h is 
11(b); it is assumed that H'(h) > U and 11(b) < 0. 
To analyze optimal consumption and portfolio behavior under the 
utility function in (28), let At denote the amount of wealth that the 
consumer holds in the form of annuities at the end of period t; the 
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remainder of the portfolio, I + Y - T - t At, is held in the form of 
riskless capital. If the consumer dies young, the bequest, B, is equal 
to the value of riskless capital with accrued interest 
D_ {I+Y-T-ct-A]R (29a) 
Alternatively, if the consumer survives for two periods, wealth in 
the second period consists of the principal and interest on annuities as 
well as on riskless capital; in addition, the consumer receives a social 
security benefit, S. Total available resources are allocated to 
consumption, x1, and to the bequest, so that 
BS [I ÷ - r - c AtR + AtQ + S - x1 (29b) 
The young consumer's consumption and portfolio decisions can be 
solved by substituting (29a,b) into (28) and then differentiating with 
respect to c, and A,. The solution to this problem is presented 
in Abel [2] The discussion below focusses on a few interesting 
implications of optimal behavior. 
Optimal behavior implies that the consumer would be indifferent 
between investing an additional dollar in riskless capital or in 
annuities)-3 An additional dollar invested in annuities would be worth 
Q dollars in the following period if the consumer survives. This 
additional wealth could be used to increase the bequest B3 by Q units, 
thereby increasing expected utility by (l-p)Q H'(B5t). Alternatively, an 
13 If the consumer faces a binding constraint on the holding of 
riskiess capital or annuities (such as a nonnegativity constraint), then 
he would not in general be indifferent about whether to invest an 
additional dollar in riskless bonds or in annuities. For this particular 
optimization problem, the consumer will choose to hold positive amounts 
of both riskiess bonds and annuities provided that H' (b) approaches 
infinity as b approaches zero; thus, any nonnegativity constraints on the 
holdings of capital or annuities would not be binding. 
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extra dollar invested in riskless capital would be worth R dollars in the 
following period regardless of whether the consumer dies or survives. In 
either case, the consumer could increase the bequest by R dollars, 
thereby intreasing expected utility by (l-p)PJ{(B5t) pRH'(S°) dollars. 
Therefore, the consumer will be indifferent between investing the dollar 
in riskless capital -and annuities if 
(l-p)Q H(BSt) (l-p)R H'(B5t) + pR FU(B0t) (30) 
Recall that if the annuities are actuarially fair, then (l-p)Q P. 
In this case, it follows directly fron (30) that S° = Btt, That is, in 
the presence of actuarially- fair annuities, the consumer plans to leave 
the same bequest whether he or she lives for one or two periods. This 
result depends on the fact that the marginal utility of a bequest does 
not depend on whether the consumer lives for one period or for two 
periods. In particular, the joy-of-giving function 11(b) does not depend 
on whether the consumer lives for one period or two periods. (The sane 
result also holds under an altruistic bequest motive.) The intuition 
behind this result is that actuarially fair annuities permit the consumer 
to completely insure the consumption basket which consists of c, 
B°t, and The strategy to achieve full insurance is implemented by 
holding just enough riskless capital to provide for the desired bequest 
and just enough annuities (including the contingent claim on the future 
social security benefit 5) to provide for second-period consumption.4 
The introduction of a fully funded social security system has no 
effect under a joy-of-giving bequest motive. The reason, as in the 
absence of a bequest motive, and as in the presence of an altruistic 
14 See Sheshinski and Weiss [241. 
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bequest motive, is that the annuity provided by the social security 
system offers exactly the same payoffs as the privately available 
annuity. Therefore, consumers can, and will, choose to fully offset the 
effects of social security. 
The effects of pay-as-you-go social security under the joy-of- 
giving bequest motive differ quite dramatically from the effects under 
a1truism. The difference is most clear in the case in which all 
consumers live for two periods with certainty (p'-O). Recall that under 
altruism, when the pay-as-you-go social security system is introduced, 
old consumers simply bequeath the payment, S, to their children in order 
to compensate them for their increased tax of S/C per capita. However. 
under the joy-of-giving bequest motive, it would nbc be optimal for old 
consumers to maintain their consumption unchanged while increasing their 
bequests by S. The reason is that the utility from leaving a bequest 
depends only on the size of the bequest and not on the utility or 
consumption of the heirs. Thus, in response to receiving the payment S. 
old consumers would increase both their consumption and the bequest they 
leave. Essentially, consumption and bequests are both goods that enter 
the consumer's utility function, and, furthermore, these are the only 
arguments of the utility function. Consumption and bequests are each 
specified to be normal goods in (28) so that in response to an increase 
in income, the consumer optimally increases consumption of both of these 
goods. 
The analysis in the paragraph above indicates that for the purpose 
of analyzing the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem, it is extremely important 
whether the bequest motive is of the altruistic or joy-of-giving variety, 
The reason is that under altruistic preferences the consumer cares about 
the entire stream of his or her family's consumption. Because the 
consumer does not care about the size of bequests per se, he or she is 
indifferent among changes in bequest patterns that maintain the initial 
Bllocation of consumption. Thus, in response to certain lump-sum tax and 
transfer policies, the consumer maintains the original path of 
consamption simply by rearranging bequests. However, under the joy-of- 
giving bequest motive, the consumer cares directly about the level of 
lequests, and therefore does not find it optimal to rearrange bequests 
while keeping consumption unchanged. 
eteroeneousMortalit-Probabilities 
Up to this point it has been assumed that all consumers face 
identical mortality probabilities cx ante. However, if consumers have 
different probabilities of survival, then there are additional channels 
through which fiscal policy may operate. in addition, heterogeneity of 
cx ante mortality probabilities raises the possibility of adverse 
selection in the private annuity market, which has iaportant consequences 
for the pricing of annuities and for the efficacy of fiscal policy. 
The implications of heterogeneous ex ante mortality probabilities 
are clearest in the absence of a bequest motive so the discussion below 
will be confined to this caseJ5 in the absence of bequest motive, and 
in the presence of private annuities, all consumers will choose to hold 
their wealth entirely in annuities and hence there will be no bequests or 
inheritances. The major strategic decision in developing a model with 
15 The effects of fiscal policy under heterogeneous mortality 
probabilites and a joy-of giving bequest motive are examined in Abel [2] 
and [3], 
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heterogeneous mortality probabilities is whether to assume that an 
individual consumer's probability of dying, p, is known only by that 
consumer or whether it is a publicly available bit of information. The 
discussion below begins with the assumption that each consumer's value of 
p is known by insurance companies. Next, the discussion will turn to the 
case in which the value of an individual's mortality probability is 
priv,ae information, These two cases are based on Abel and [fl, 
respectively, 
Public Knowledge of Mortality Probabilities: Suppose that the ex 
ante mortality probability of each consumer is known to everyone, 
including insurance companies. Under this assumption, of course, 
competitive insurance companies will offer annuities with different rates 
of return to consumers with different values of p. Annuities will be 
priced to be actuarially fair to each consumer so that a consumer with a 
probability p of dying young can buy annuities that offer a rate of 
return 
— R/(l-p) (31) 
If follows immediately from (31) that consumers with a high 
probability of dying young will be able to purchase annuities with a high 
rate of return. Equivalently, these consumers can buy a given contingent 
payoff in the second period more cheaply than could healthier consumers 
who have a lower value of p. However, the expected rate of return on 
annuities, (l)Q1 is identical for all consumers and is equal to R. 
Suppose that all consumers have logarithmic preferences as 
specified in (3). Let c(p) denote the consumption of a young consumer 
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whose probability of dying young is equal to p It follows immediately 
from the consumption funotion in (21) that 
c(p) a(p) fT - T (l-p)S/R] (32) 
where a(p) 1/fl + (l-p)D]. Observe that the marginal propensity to 
consume, a(p), is an increasing function of p. Thus, if S T 0, 
then 
consumption of young consumers would be an intreasing funotion of p. 
The 
reawn is that with logarithmit preferences and no aetond-period incote, 
consumption when young is independent of the rate of return on savings. 
Thus the fact that consumers with a higher value of p ran obtain 
annuities with a higher rate of return is irrelevant for the tonsunption 
decision, However, because consumers with a high p have a small chance 
of enjoying consumption in the second period, they will consume more when 
they are young. This result, that c(p) is an increasing function of p, 
holds also for positive S and T, prowided that the values of these tax 
parameters are omall, 
lly FHped2oujS&L&sHr,itfl Now consider the effects of a fully 
funded social security system that ignores differences in cx ante 
mortality probabilities The assumption is not that the government is 
unable to observe ax ante mortality probabilities that are ohservsblo by 
insurance companies; rather, the assumption is that, for some reason, 
the social security system does not discriminate according to mortality 
probabilities Under a fully funded social security system, 
the benefits 
and taxes satisfy 
(l-p*)S RT (33) 
where p* is the avetage of the cx ante mortality probabilities of yourg 
tonsuzsers. substituting the social security parameters from /33) into 
the consumption function 32) yields 
c(p) — a(p) fT (p*p)T/(l-p*)) (34) 
Observe from (34) that the consumption of young consumers with a 
higher than average probability of dyirg (p > p*) is reduced by the 
intr&uction of social security the consumption of young conumers witn 
a loser than average pronshilitv of dyicg is increased by the 
introduction of social securirt These effects on consumptior reflect 
the fact that non-discrirsinacoty sociai security redistributes income 
from consumers with a high value of p to consumers with a low value of p 
The social security system forcer consumerb to hold an annuity with gross 
rate of return SIT R/(l-p*) For consumers with p > p, this rate of 
return is 1e55 than the rate ci returc availaole on private annuities and 
thus these consumers are made poorer by the irtroduction of sons1 
security. By contrast for crrsumers with p < p, the annuity prov1dc- 
by social security offers a higher rate of rerun. char is otherwise 
available to them. Hence these consumers are made wealthier and increase 
their consumptior 
The introduction of social security shift resources, and hence 
consumption, away from consumers with a high varue of p toward consumers 
with a low value of p Because consumers with high value of p 
initially had high consumption relative to censumera with 
a low vlue of 
p, this redistribution of resources reduces the cross-sectional 
variation 
in consumption. Note that the mechanism for reducing cross-sectionaL 
variation differs from the mechanism in the csse without annuities and 
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with accidental bequests. In that case, the source of cross-sectional 
variation was accidental bequests; by reducing savings, social security 
reduced accidental bequests and cross-sectional variation, In the 
present model, there are no bequests. The source of variation, in the 
absence of social security, is the difference in marginal propensities to 
consume which results from different mortality probabilities. 
In addition to reducing cross-sectional variation in consumption, 
the introduction of fully funded social security reduces the aversge 
fe1of consumption of young consumers. This reduction in average 
consumption arises because the social security aysten transfers resourres 
from consumers with a high marginal prooensity to consume (high p 
consumers) to consumers with a low marginal propensity to consume (low p 
consumers), This result can be derived formally by defining t(Z(p) as 
the population average value of some arbitrary function Z(p).16 With 
this dafinirion. the average consumption of young ronsumers is E(c(p) 
where 
E(c(p)) E(a(pflY E((p*p)a(pflT/(lp*) (35) 
it can be shown formally that ENp*.p)a(p)) is negative. 
intuitively, the reason is that E((p*p)a(p)) is equal to E(p*-p)E(a(pfl 
5 Cov(p*p,a(p)). Because E(p*.p) is, by definition, equal to zero, it 
follows that E((p*p)a(p)) is equal to Cov(p*p,a(pfl. Since pt-p is 
16 At a formal level, let f(p) denote the density function of the cx 
ante mortality probability p. With this definition, the average cx ante 
probability p* is equal to 
I 
J0 pf(p)dp. Now define E(Z(p)) f Z(p)f(p)dp so that E(Z(pfl is the 
average value of Z(p). 0 
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decreasing in p and a(p) is increasing in p, this covariance is negative. 
Therefore, 
E((p*p)a(p)) < 0 (36) 
The inequality in (36) implies that the coefficient of T in (35) is 
negative. Therefore, as argued above, an increase in T leads to a 
reduction in average consumption of young consumers 
Private Information and Adverse Selection: Now suppose that there 
is heterogeneity of cx ante mOrtalIty probabilicies and that indi:idual 
mortality probabilities are private information More specifically, 
suppose that each individual consumer knows nis or her own e ante 
mortality probability, but that no one else knows that person's value of 
p. However, the distribution of cx ante morrvli:y probabilities in the 
population is public knowledge. This informa'ion structure gives rise to 
a classic adverse selection problem In the case of annuities, the high 
risk consumers from the viewpont of insurance crspanies are those 
consumers with a low mortality probability p. These consumers will 
demand more annuities tian the consumers with hto mortality 
probabilities and they will be more likely to survive and receive annuity 
payments. 
In general, the equilibrium in the presence of adverse selection is 
either a pooling equilibrium in which consumers do not reveal thear 
private information, or a separating equilibrium in which the optimal 
behavior of consumers reveals their private information To simplify the 
determination of the market equilibrium, an additional assumption will be 
made. In particular, assume that an insurance company cannot determine 
whether any given consumer has purchased annuities from other insurance 
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companies. The foroe of this assumption ia to rule out separating 
aquilibria in which consumers with different mortality risks face 
different rates of return on annuities. If insurance companiea tried to 
charge higher prices (i.e., offer lower rates of return) to consumera 
with low p, then these consumers would masquerade aa high p consumers and 
would buy only a small amount of annuities at a given inaurance company. 
Than these consumers would aatisfy their relatively large demand for 
annuities by purchasing additional annuities from one or more other 
companies, Therefore, an insurance company's attempt to separate its 
customers by offering different quantities of annuities at different 
prices would fail. Insteed, the market would be characterized by ooe 
rate of return that is offered on all annuities. Because of adverse 
selection, this rate of return would have to be lower than R/(l-p*), 
which is the actuarially fair rate based on population average mortslity. 
In the absence of a bequest motive the demand for annuities by s 
consumer will be equal to the consumer's savings, which is equal to 
firstperiod income, Y - T, minus consumption in the first period. Let 
A(p;Q) denote the amount of annuity demanded by a young consumer with a 
mortality probability p when the rate of return on annuities is C). Using 
the consumption function in (21), it follows that 
A(p;Q) [1-a(p)] fY - TJ - a(p)S/Q (37) 
Equation (37) implies that in the absence of social security (S T 
0), the demand for annuities is invariant to the rate of return they 
offer, This invariance is a consequence of the offsetting income and 
substitution effects associated with logarithmic utility. Now recall 
that a'(p) > 0 which implies that 1 - a(p) is a decreasing function of p. 
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Thus, if Y - T - S/Q > 0, then the demand for annuities is a decreasing 
function of p. 
The equilibrium rare of return on annuities is such that the 
expected profit of insurance companies is equal to zero, Insurance 
companies will, on average, earn positive profits on annuities sold to 
ronsumers with high values of p bur will, on average, suffer losses on 
snnl4ities sold to consumers with low values of p. More precisely in 
tLe 
absence of socIal security the expected profit on annuities sold to 
consumer with nortality pcohabillty p is [a - (l-p)Q}A(p;Q). Let a 
denote the expected pcofi uf 'be a-inuity industry averaging over all 
consumers, and observe thst 
iv E{R - "l p)Q[A(p;Q) (38) 
This expressior' rsn be rewcittsu using the fact that 1-p (l-p5) 
(p*-p) to obtain 
a [P. (l-p*)QiEA'p'Q) - ENp*p)A(p'Q)}Q (39) 
Observe that E(p*-p} 0 and recall that, in the absence of soccal 
security, A(p;Q) - s(p)Y Thus, in the absence of sociat security 
the expected profit of the annuity industry ten he rewritten as 
[R - (lp*)Q'E1l-a'p)} + g((p*-p)a(pflQ (40) 
The two terms on tne caght hand side of (40) have a binple 
interpretation. The first term is the expected profit of the annuity 
industry that would prevail if all consumers oucchssed the 
same amount of 
annuities regardless of their cx sate mortalities prubsbilities. 
The 
second term, which is negative according to equation (36) represents toe 
expected losses inflicted on insurance companies due to adverse 
selection. Observe that each of the two terms on the tight bend side of 
(40) is a decreasing function of Q. Therefore, the expected profit of 
the annuity industry is strictly decreasing in the rate of return offered 
on annuities, In addition, note that if the rate of return on annuities 
is actuarially fair based on the population average probability p*, i.e. 
if Q R/(lp*), then the first term on the right hand side of (40) would 
be equal to zero, In this case, r/Y would equal E((p*p)a(p)}Q which is 
negative. Therefore, any rate of return on annuities greater than or 
equal to R/(lp*) would lead to expected losses for the annuity industry 
and could not an equilibrium. 
The equilibrium rate of return of annuities must yield zero 
axoected profits on annuities. In this case, with logarithmic utility. 
and in the absence of social security, this rate of return is unique. 
Setting the axpected profit, ir, equal to zero in (38) yields 
Q A E(l-a(p)) / E((l-p)(la(p))) (41) 
Thllj Funded Social Securim Now consider the effects of 
;rtvoducing fully' funded social security. Although social security has 
tha payoff characteristics of an annuity, there is an important 
difference between social security and the annuities available in the 
private market, Because the social security system focces all young 
consumers to 
"purchase" equal amounts of the annuity it provides, the 
social security system is immune to adverse selection. The rate of 
return implicit in social security, S/T, is equal to R/(l-p*) as in (33). 
To calculate the effect of social security on the national capital 
stock, substitute the relation between the social security parameters S 
and T in (33) into the annuity demand function (37) to obtain 
A(p;Q) - [l-a(p)]Y - T - [F - (l-p*)Q][a(p)/(lp*)Q]T (42) 
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Recall mat as a consequence of adverse selection, R - (lpw)Q > 0. 
Thetefore, equatcon (42) indicates ttat the introduction of fully funded 
social security reduces the deaand for annuities by uore than T, hence, 
the private capital stock falls by more than T. The demand for annuitiec 
would decrease by precisely ifQwore equal to R/(l-p*). However, 
because social security provides an annuity with a larger payoff than is 
available on private annuities, the introduction of social sectrity 
expands the opportunity set of all consumers and hence induces all 
consumers to increase their runs uctrion when souno, This increae in 
consumption means that the private capital stock falls by rora than T. 
Therefore the national capital atock, whrch is equal to the private 
capital stock plus T, suco declineat/ 
In order to determine effects or social terurity on the equilibrium 
rate of return on private annuities first ralculate the change in the 
structure of the demand for priucte annuities. Differentiating the 
annuity demand function in (42) with respect tol and evaluating the 
derivative at S f C, yields 
dA(p;Q)/dT15TQ = 1 + R - 'lp*)Qya(p)/(i-p*,Q} (43) 
The term in curly brackets on the right hand aide of (43) is an 
increasing function of p. rnerefore, consumers with a hign value of p 
reduce their demand for annuIties by a greater umounc rust consumers with 
a low value of p. Since consumers with a high value ol p began with a 
lower annuity demand than low p consumers, it is clear that the high p 
consumers reduce their demand for annuitiea by a larger fraction than do 
17 This reduction in the private capital stock depends on the abaence of 
a bequeat motive, If there is a sufficiently strong joy-of-giving 
bequest motive, then the national capital stock may increase in response 
to the introduction of fully funded social security. See Abel [2]. 
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the low p consumers. Hence the share of annuities bought by high p 
consumers is reduced, which reduces the expected profits of rhe annuity 
industry, in order to restore zero expected profits, it is necessary for 
the rate of return on annuities to decline, 
in concluding the discussion of armuity markets, it is useful to 
examine the quantitative effect of adverse selection in private annuity 
rarkeAs. Friedman and Warshawaky ill] and Warshawaky [25[ have analyzed 
annuity prices and the mortality experiences of annuity purchasers in. the 
United States. They found that annuity purchasers tend to live longer 
than the a:ierage American as tabulated in the U.S. Life. Tables. To get a 
aeaanre of how nuch longer annuity purchasers live, they calculate load 
factors - The gross load factor is defined as the ratio of the price paid 
for an annuity to the expected present value of the payments accruing to 
an annuity purchaser; the net load factor i.s equal to the gross load 
faoto-z ?oinus one. These load factors are calculated under two different 
assumptions about mortality: in one calculation, the mortality 
p-rohab-iiities are taken from the U.S. Life Tables and in the other 
calculation, the mortality probabilities are calibrated to match the 
'oortelitv experience of annuity purchasers. Not surprisingly, they found 
that the expected present value of payments using annuity purchasers' 
mortality is greater than the expected present value of payments using 
the L'S. Life Table. Therefore, the load factor based on annuity 
ourchasers' mortality is less than the load factor based on the U.S. Life 
Table. Very roughly, the average net load factor based on the US. Life 
Tahie was around 30 cents on the dollar; the average net load factor 
based on the mortality of annuity purchasers was about 15 cents on the 
dollar. The difference in load factors, 15 cents on the dollar was 
attributed to adverse salection8 However, the extent to which the 
difference in mortality probabilities was private information or public 
information could not be determined from these studies. 
Although the load factors reported in these studies are 
substantial, they do not appear to be large enough to explain the 
widepread shunning of annuity markets by private consumers, Friedman 
and Warshawsky ll] attribute a boat pact of the reluctance of 
consumers to buy annuities to a bsqieat motive, out unanswered questions 
remain, For example, to what 0x'tnt do corsumers nold bequeathaoie 
wealth rather than level-payment annuities as a precaution against the 
need to make very large medical expenditures? Perhaps this risk of 
catastrophic medical expenditure explains the fact that retired consumers 
decumulate their wealth much yore alowy than predicted by the life-cycle 
model. Clearly more research iito these ciaks and consumers' reactions 
to these risks is needed 
ar: The discos.Aon of tna effecto of fiscal policy in cne 
presence of longevity risk has examined several different sets of 
assumptions about bequest nocives, the type of fiscal policy and the 
availability and pricing of snnuities Rather than summarise all of 
these cases, a few of the major themes will be highlighted. The insight 
of the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem is that fiscal policy will affect 
18 Moce precisely, Friedman and Warshswsky [11 examine data for the 
period 1968-1983 and find load factors of 32-48 cents on the dollar using 
the 1,1,8. Life Tables; they find load factors of 18-33 cents on the dollar 
sfter allowing for adverse selection. Warshawsky [25 examines data from 
the period 1919-1984 and finds load factors of 10-29 cents on the dollar 
using the U.S. Life Tables. He attributes 8 to 16 cents on the dollar of 
these load factors to adverse sslection. 
private economic activity only if it changes the opportunities available 
to individuals, Such changes in opportunities could take the form of 
changes in relative prices c-c changes in- the present value of resources. 
In applying the insight of the kicardian Equivalence Theorem to 
social security, it is useful to think of social security as an annuity 
because consumers pay someth-ing when they are young in exchange for 
somgthing that they will receive only if they sunive, Clearly, if there 
is no market in which consumers can buy annuities then the introduction 
of social security changes consumers' opportunity sets by providing on 
sonuity. Not only does the introduction of social security affect rho 
roving decisions of consumers who receive no ir-herirantes, it also 
reduces the itheritamces of those people who do receive them. 
Alternatively, if there is a private market for annuities, then the 
Introduction of social security will have an effect only if the annuity 
provided by social secu.rity offers different terms than those offered by 
rsvstery traded annuities. If consumers have identical mortality 
probabilities and if the rate of return on private annuities is 
actoerially fair, then fully funded social security offers the same rate 
of roturn as private annuities and thus has no effect, This invariance 
of economic behavior to the introduction of fully funded social security 
holds regardless of whether consumers have a bequest motive or not and 
holds regardless of the form of the bequest motive, 
There are several reasons why the rate of return on social security 
may differ from the rate of return on private annuities. First, pay-as- 
you-go social security offers an expected rate of return equal to the 
copulation growth rate rather than the rate of return on capital. Thus, 
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in general, pay-as-you-go social security offers a different rate of 
return from the rate of return in competitive annuity markets. Second, 
if consumers have different mortality probabilities and if individual 
consumers possess private information about their own mortality 
probabilities, then the private annuity market will be subject to adverse 
selection which drives down the rate of return on annuities. In this 
case, 
-fully funded social security would offer a higner rate of return 
than private annuities. Third, even if each individual consumer's 
mortality probability is publicly known, then socia security will Lava 
an effect if the government decides not to discriminate on the basis of 
mortality probabilities. In this case, the government offers the same 
taxes and benefits to a consumers, but ic the pr atS market consumers 
face different prices for a given level of second-period benefits. 
Therefore, for at leat sorru consumera social secnrity will offer a 
different rate of return ciun pcivte annuities. 
It might seem that if me rate of return on cociat security is 
different from the rate of return on pcivateiy araiab_e annuities, then 
the introduction of social securit' aouid cave an effect on private 
saving decisions. This presumption is indeed true if consumers do not 
have bequest motives or if they I-ave joy-of-giving bequest motives 
However, if consumers have altruistic bequest motires, then it may be 
that social security has no effect even though it offets a rate of return 
that differs from che rate on any privately traded asset. For instance, 
in the absence of longevity risk, fully-funded social securaty would have 
no effect even though the rate of return on social security differs from 
the rate of return on capital. However, in the presence of longevity 
risk, the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem could fail to hold even under 
altruism 
III, Income Risk 
In the previous sections of this paper, the risks have been 
confined to uncertainty about the length of an individual's lifetime. 
The market for life insurance and annuities allows consumers to reduce 
the affects of these risks and, as discussed above, the functioning of 
these markets has important implications for the effects of fiscal 
toiicv. This section will ignore longevity risk and focus instead on me 
risk associated with an individual's future labor income. Future labor 
income is risky for two reasons, First, there is a chance that a 
consumer will not be able to work as a result of an accident or illness. 
fecond, even if the consumer is able to work, future income will 
as a result cf fluctuations in productivity or in the demand 
oc ass or her services, Because disability insurance is available to 
reduce, or even eliminate, the first of these sources of income risk, the 
discussion will ignore this source of risk, focussing instead on the 
second source of income risk. 
At first glance, it appears that there is no insurance available tc 
reduce the risk associated with fluctutations in productivity or in 
demand, Although there is no active insurance market to reduce the 
riskiness of a future income stream, the income tax system provides a 
form of income insurance, If the income tax rate is constant, say at 
27%, then the government essentially shares 27% of the risks associated 
with fluctuations in labor income. Not only does the income tax provide 
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risk reduction as would more conventional types of insurance, it is also 
subject to the problem of moral hazard, as discussions of the Lsffer 
Curve have made clear, More precisely, while the income tax provides 
some insurance against fluctuations in labor income, it also provides a 
disincentive to wor,c; the Leffer Curve is based on the possibilsry that 
a tax rate increase will reduce work effort to such am extent that intone 
taxrevenue would decline. In order to isolate the risk-reducIng effects 
of the income tax, and to fooss or precautionary saving the analysis 
will be based on the sssumpt400. ma labor supply Is perfecci" mnelssrcc. 
Therefore, future labor income "ili be treated as an exogenous scochesrir 
variable from the vievpoint of cde individual consumer. 
Consider a consumer vhc lives for two periods and receives 
exogenous income y an in parmods I end 2, respectively. The 
consumer pays total trace r- and ' i- periods I end 2, respectively. 
The deterimination of the n.nsner s max brIl sill be discussed in more 
detail below Let c1 and 0/ 'C consumption in. periooe I and 2 
respectively. The sevng of young rvns'user Is y1 - 0 - '1 For 
simplicity, suppose that the net rate of return on caving :o equal to 
zero. In this case, the consumer's second-period .onsamprion is equal tc 
saving plus second-period income net of texes, y2 - r2. 
c2 y1-C1-c1+y7-r5 (44) 
Suppose that the consumer's uciilry function is 
u(c1) + u(c2) (45) 
Now consider a young consumer's saving derision. When making this 
decision, the consumer knows the values of y1 and ml but knows only the 
probability distributions of 
'2 and r2 At the optimal level of 
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consumption, the consumer is indifferent between consuming an additionai 
unit in period 1 and inoreasing savings by one unit. If Cl is increased 
by one unit, then the consumer's utility increases by u'(c1 
Alternatively, if the oonsumer saves an additional unit, then seccnd 
period consumption, 02, increases by one unit, which increases expected 
utility by E{u'(o2)) where E(} denotes the expectation conditional on' 
firgt-period information. The optimal consumption decision is 
odaratterized by 
u'(ol) E(u'(c2fl (46) 
A - CqflintvErJalence 
tuppose, for the moment. that the utility function u(c) i-s 
uadratic: u(c) c2/2 + ho, where the parameter b is positive. 10 this 
case, the marginal utitility is linear in consumption 
u' (c) c + b (47) 
t-ubsti tuting the marginal utility function (47) into the iirst 
order condition (46) yields 
Eo2) 01 (48) 
Equation (48), which displays Robert Hall's [l5 famous random walk 
theory of consumption, indicates that the expectation of future 
ronaumption is equal to current consumption. Equivalently, oonsumptioc- 
follows a random walk, The reason is that, with concave utility, 
consumers attempt to mitigate fluctuations in consumption over time, in 
response to an increase in income, a consumer increases both current 
consumption and planned future consumption. In the case with quadratic 
utility and equal rates of interest and time preference (both are zero in 
this particular case), it turns out the intreases in c1 and the expected 
4t 
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value of c2 are exactly equal. Under a more general utility function, 
consumption does not follow a random walk exactly, but the marginal 
utility of consumption does follow a random walk as in (46) 
The optimal level of c1 under quadratic utility can 
be determined 
by substituting the budget constraint (44) into the first-order condition 
(48) to obtain 
c1 
— (l/2){y, - t1 + My2 - t2)) (49) 
The consumption function in (49) displays rUe permanent income/life 
cycle theory of consumption. It satea that conaumprion Ia a function 
of 
the expected preaent value of lifetime income, net of taxes. In this 
parricular example, it is optimal to consume one half of expected 
lifetime income in the firat period The consumption function in (49) 
also illustrates the certainty equivalence principle. More generally, 
the certainty equivalence principle applies to optimization problems 
with 
a quadratic objective funcrion and linear constraints with additive 
uncertainty. It states that optimal decision :ules depend on the 
expected values of random varablea, but do not depeno on any u:r.er 
momenta of the distributions of the random variablea. In particular, the 
variance of the random variables is irrelevant and may as well be assumed 
to be zero. Equivalently, the optimal decision rule la identical to the 
rule that would prevail if all random variables were equal to their 
expected values with certainty. 
Precautionary saving is defined as the additional saving induced by 
the introduction of uncertainty about future income. Beoauae the 
conaumption function in (49) is independent of the variance of future 
income, it is not useful for examining precautionary saving. Although 
the quadratic utility function on which (P9) is based displays risk 
aversion, optimal behavior does nct display precautionary saving. An 
increase in the variance of y2-t2 reduces the axpected utility of the 
consumer; however it does not change the consumer's behavior at all. 
If there were actuarially fair insurance against the risks associated 
with second-period income, the consumer would buy it. However, the 
consumer would choose the same level of 01 regardless of whether or rot 
such insurance is available, In terms of the specification of the 
utility function, risk aversion requires a positive second derivative, 
hut precautionary saving reouires a positive third derivative, 19 The 
cuadratic utility function, of course, has a positive seccnd derivative 
but s zero third derivative, 
ut ionar' a'; in 
Now consider a utility function with a positive third derivative so 
tOot the optimal consumption function will display; precautionary saving. 
Tot simplicity, suppose that the utility function is u(c) 
-exp{kc] 
stare k > 0 is th,e coefficient of absolute risk aversion, 20 The isarginel 
utility function is 
u'(c) k exp[-kc] (50) 
Substituting the utility function from (50) into the first-order 
condition (46), and using the budget constraint (44) to eliminate 02, 
vie Ids 
exp[-kc,] E(expc-k(y1 - + p2 - t. - c,)]) (51) 
19 For an excellent discussion of the relation between risk aversion end 
precautionary saving, see Kimball [18). 
20 Kimball and Hankiw [19) examine the precautionary saving of an 
infinite-horizon consumer with a constant absolute risk aversion utility 
function, They use their model to examine the interaction of tax policy 
and precautionary saving in a richer dynamic framework. 
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To calculate the expectation on the right hand side of (51) the 
distribution of the random variable y2 - must be specified. Suppose 
that y2 - t2 is normally distributed with mean Ey2 - t2) and variance 
var(y2 - t2}. Under this distributional assumption, the expectation of 
exp-k(y2 - t2)) is equal to exp[kE(y2-t2+(l/2)k2Var{Y2t2H and 
equation (51) can be rearranged to yield 
-c1 [y1 - t + E{y2 - t2) - (l/2)k var(y2-t2)/2 (52) 
The consumption function in (52) displays precautionary saving. 
Consumption in the first period s a linear and decreasing function of 
the variance of second-period after-tax income. Therefore, saving is a 
linear and increasing function of the variance of future after-tax 
income. 
C. Fiscal Policy 
The simple consumption function in (52), which displays 
precautionary saving, can be used to examine the interaction of 
precautionary saving and various tax policies. In particular, this 
framework can be easily used to examine the impact of both 5mp-aum taxes 
and income taxes. Many of the results presented below were derived for a 
more general utility function by Louis Chan 6I In this particular 
model, as in Chan's model, income is exogenous so that the incentive 
effects of taxes on labor effort will be ignored. By treating income as 
exogenous, this model focusses on the insurance aspects of the income 
tax, 
Suppose that the second-period tax consists of a head tax, t, plus 
a proportional income tax, at rate r (0 < r < 1), so that 
t2 
— t + y2 (53) 
and after-tax income is given by 
y2 
- t2 — (1 - r)y2 t* (54) 
Now consider an increase in the income tax rater accompanied oy a 
reduction in the head tax t* that leaves the expected second-period tax 
payment, E(t2), unchanged. Because the axpected tax payment is held 
fixed, this change in tax structure leaves E(y2 - t2} unchanged. 
However, the increase in r reduces the variance of after-tax income, 
var(y2 - t2), which is equal to (l-r)2var{y2}. l.t follows immediately 
from (52) that this reduction in the variance of after-tax income indcces 
an increase in first-period consumption. Thus, uhen the income insurance 
associated with the income tax is increased, there is a decline in 
crecautionary saving ,Note, in addition, that this increase in the 
income tax rate, compensated by a decrease in the heed tax, leads to an 
increase in expected utility. 
The next step in the analysis ci fiscal policy is to examine 
agredate income and to specify the relation between individual- income 
and aggregate income. Let £2 denote the fevel of aggregate income per 
capita in the second-period, Suppose that individual income, y2, is 
y2 2 a (55) 
where a represents the idiosyncratic random component of income and E(e) 
E(e 0. These assumptions imply that the idiosyncratic component, 
a, is uncorrelated with aggregate income Y2. 
In examining various tax and transfer policies, one must make sure 
that the policy changes satisfy the government's budget constraint. F-or 
simplicity, suppose that all consumers pay the same tax. t1, in period 1 
and that all consumers pay the same head tax, t*, in period 2. Second- 
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period tax bills will differ across consumers to the extent that their 
second-period incomes differ The government budget constraint states 
that total tax revenues over the two periods must equal total government 
spending over the two periods. Letting g denote the total value of 
government spending, the government's budget constraint is 
+ t* ÷ rY2 g (56) 
-The lifetime tax liability of an individual may be calculated by 
adding r e to both aides of (56), and using the fact that y2 Y2 + e to 
obtain 
t1 + ÷ 
= g + ze (57) 
Obsenie that the left hand side of (57) is equal to t1 t2. 
Therefore, equation (57), along with (55), can be used to rewrite the 
first-order condition (51) as 
exp[-kc1] 
E(expHk(y1 + - g + l-r) e - c1)fl (58) 
To calculate the expectation on the right hand side of (58). the 
distributions of the random variables Y2 and e must be specified. :t has 
already been assumed that a has a mean equal to zero and that and e 
are uncorrelated. ln addition, assume that and e are each normally 
distributed. Under this assumption, the expectation on the rig'nt hand 
side of (58) can be calculated. Simplifying this expression yields 
ci (1/2)[y1 + E(Y2 - g] 
- (1/4)k[VarIY2; ÷ Var((1-r)e (59) 
The consumption function in (59) embodies both the optimizatior. of 
the individual consumer as well as the government's budget constraint. 
It can be used to examine the effects of various fiscal policies Note 
that the government's budget constraint involves four policy variables: 
the first period tax t1, the second-period head tax t*, the second-period 
income tax rate a, and the total value of government expenditure, g. 
However, only two of these four variables, namely g and a, enter the 
consumption function in (59). Thus, consumption in the first-period does 
not directly depend on the first-period tax, t1, nor on the second-period 
heoct tax t*, Thia obsenation immediately auggeata a policy change for 
which the Ricsrdian Equivalence Theorem applies Consider a one do] lar 
incrosse in the first-period tax, t1, accompanied by a decrease in rho 
asrond-period head tax cc, This rhange satisfies the government budgor 
constraint, It is clear from (59), that since neither of these tax 
parameters enters the consumption function, this temporary tax increase 
has no effect on consumption. 
Next, consider a tax change for which the Ricardian Equivalence 
Ihooter, does not apply. In particular, consider an increase in the firs: 
Period tax ci that is accompanied by an appropriate decrease in the 
recrnd-period income tax rate a, as determined by the government budget 
conscrsint, In examining the effacts of this tax policy, it is useful to 
focus on two special cases of the rsndor: processes for income. First, 
oonsider the case in which there is no uncertainty about future aggregate 
income Y7. In this case, which corresponds to the case considered by 
Bsrsky, Msnkiw and Zeldes [5], the consumption function in (59) can be 
written as 
[y1 E(Y2) - g - (l/2)k(l-r Vsc(e)]/2 (60) 
It follows immediately from (60) chat the increase in ci and the 
accompanying decrease in a will reduce first-period consumption, provided 
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that Vat 0, The reason for this reduction in consumption is that 
the reduction in the future tax rate r implies that the government will 
be sharing a smaller fraction of the idiosyncratic income risk. As a 
consequence, the consumer will face a greater income risk and thus will 
increase precautionary saving. 
Alternatively, consider the case in which aggregate income is 
unc?rtain but there is no idiosyncratic risk (i.e. varte} 0. In this 
case, the consumption function in '59) can be written as 
= y1 + E{Y2 - g - (l/2)kVar{Y2)/2 (El) 
In the absence of idiosyncratic income risk none of the three tax 
parameters enters the consumption function in (61), Therefore, an 
increase in t1 accompanied by an approprate decrease in r has rio effect 
on consumption. Thus, the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem applies in this 
case. The reason is that even though there is uncertainty about future 
aggregate income and about the tax rate on future income, there is no 
uncertainty about the future tax liability of any consumer. Each 
consumer pays an extra dollar in taxes in period 1. Therefc.re, the 
aggregate tax revenue in period 2 must be reduced by one dollar per 
capita. Because the idiosyncratic component of income has been assumed 
to be identically zero, each consumer knows with certainty that his or 
her second-period tax bill will be equal to the aggregate per capita tax 
bill, Since the aggregate per capita tax bill will fall by one dollar, 
each consumer knows with certainty that his or her future taxes will fall 
by one dollar, exactly offsetting the one dollar increase in period 1 
taxes. Therefore, there is no change in the optimal level of first- 
period consumption. 
The effect of changes in the tax rate r have dramatically different 
effects depending on whether the uncertainty associated with second 
period income is idiosyncratic or is common to all consumers. If the 
second period income risk is idiosyncratic, then an income tax allows 
consumers to share risks with each other, Therefore, a reduction in the 
income tax rate would reduce the extent of insurance and would lead to 
inopeased precautionary saving. By contrast, if there is no 
idiosyncratic component to second period income risk, then individual 
consno,ers cannot reduce their risks by abating with other consumers In 
this case, the incone tax does not provide any insurance and the 
Ricsrdian Equivalence Theoreo holds, Although aggregate risks cannot be 
shored across members of a generation, it is possible that aggregate 
risks could be shared across generation. Intergenerational risk sharing 
is examined in the next section. 
IV. Intergenerational gisk Sharing 
Virtually all of the risks diacusaod in previous sections are 
within- generational risks in the sense that different members of the same 
generation obtain different realizations of a random variable. Except 
icc problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, these risks could be 
potcntially shared among members of the same cohort, By contrast, this 
section will focus on risks that cannot be abated among members of the 
same cohort because all members of a given cohort face the same risk cx 
post as well as ax ante. To be more specific, this section will examine 
income shocks that strike all members of a cohort to exactly the same 
if 
degree. If there is to be any risk sharing, it must be done by sharing 
risks among two or more generations. 
Intergenerational risk-sharing has been studied by Roger Gordon and 
Hal Varian 114]; the discussion below draws heavily on their analysis and 
extends their model to allow for population growth. Consider an econony 
with overlapping generations of consumers, each of whom lives for two 
perio4a. Each generation is C times as large as the generation that 
preceded it. A consumer who is born in period t receives a perfectly 
storable deterministic endowment w in period r and receives a random 
endowment el in period t÷l. Suppose that er+l has a mean of rero and 
is identically and independently distributed across generations. For 
simplicity, conaumption is confined to the second period of life. Let 
c+1 denote the consumption in period t+l of a consumer born in period t 
The realized value of the consumer's utslity in period t+l is u(c÷1, 
where the utility function u( ; is sr'ictiy increasing and strictly 
concave. 
All members of generation c face the sane wat:e of the random 
variable e+1. Therefore, there is no scope for within-generation risk- 
sharing. Also, because adjacent generations are simultaneously alive for 
only one period, there is no scope for private markets to share risks 
across memhera of adjacent generations. rherefore, if there is to be 
intergenerational risk sharing, then a long-lived institution, aurh as a 
government, must be involved. 
Consider the following scheme to share risks. Suppose that the 
government levies a tax of r e+i (where 0  r I) on each old consumer 
in period t+l. and uses the proceeds of the tax to give a subsidy of r 
e1/G to each young consuner in period ta-I, Of course, if e÷1 is 
negative, then old consumers receive an unlucky realization of income and 
the tax levied on old consumers is negative. Thus, if e÷1 is negative, 
the tax aystem transfers resources from the young consumers to the old 
consumers. In. the presence of this tax system, the consumption of an old 
consumer in period t±l is 
°t+l w + (r/O)et (lr)et÷1 (62) 
Thus, this tax scheme spreads the risk associated with the random 
endowment across two adjacent generations. 
n.fl3f,lRi5k Sharing 
Now consider the value of the tax rate a that maximizes the ox ante 
utility of a generation t consumer, Ecu(ct÷1)), where the expectation is 
calculata-d at the beginning of the consumer's life, prior to observing 
the realization of the random variable e5. This is the tax rate that a 
0000u.uer would choose if he had no knowledge of the particular 
realirstions ci random income that would occur during his lifetime. The 
soulstion of the optimal value of a is simplified by using (62) to 
observe that the expectation of consumption, E(c_+1), is invariant to the 
tax rate a (because E(c, I w), Thus, because the utility function u() eta - 
is concave, the optimal tax rate is the rate that minimizes the 
unconditional variance of consumption. It follows immediately from (62) 
that the unconditional variance of consumption is 
Var(c÷1) [(a/C)2 + (la)2] Var(e) (63) 
The optimal value of a can be found by differentiating (63) with 
respect to a and setting the derivative equal to sero to obtain2 
21 The risk sharing scheme is the optimal scheme within the class of 
schemes that share the risk associated with e across two adjacent 
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r 1/il + G-2J (64) 
Observe from (64) that in the absence of population growth, i.e. 
with C — 1, the optimal value of r is equal to 1/2, In this case, 
optimal risk spreading across pairs of adjacent generations involves eacn 
generation having a 50% stake in each of the cwo drawings of e that take 
place while that generation is alive, More generally, with G > 1, the 
optma1 value of r is greater than 1/2. Substituting the optimal value 
of r from (64) into the expression for consumption (62) yields 
— w + G/(l+G2)e + l/(l+G2)Jet, (65) 
If C is greater than one, then the coefficients on e and are 
each less than 1/2. Thus, in the presence of population growch, it is 
possible for generation t to have lass chan a 50% stake in the risk 
associated with e and et+i. Each old consumer lays off more than half 
of the old-age income risk on rhe younger generation. However, because 
the younger generation has more people than the older generation it can 
absorb this increased risk with an increase in risk per person chat is 
smaller than the reduction in risk per old :onsuiner. 
B. Time Consistency 
The optimal intergenerational fiscal insurance system presented 
above was derived under the assumption that this system will remain in 
force. However, it may turn out that some cohorts may not want to 
participate in the fiscal risk-sharing arrangement. Whet, a generation is 
old and receives a positive value of et+l, this generacion would like to 
sever its participation. This type of desire to pull out of a system 
will not be considered here. If these old consumers had, when they were 
generations. Gordon and Varian [14] show that sharing the risk across 
more generations leads to even higher ex ante utility. 
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young, voluntarily decided to participate in the risk-sharing 
arrangement, then they will not he allowed to renege on their implied 
contract just because they received a positive value of e,1. 
The interesting question concerning the viability of the fiscal 
insurance system is whether young consumers in period t will, after 
learning the value of e, choose to participate in this system. The 
reaon they may choose not to participate is that if e is negative, they 
are required to make a net transfer to old consumers, If the value of 
the risk reduction provided by th,e fiscal insurance system is less then 
the value of the required transfer, then these young consumers will 
choose not to participate. However, if the valua of the risk reduction 
exceeds the value of the required transfer, then young consumers would 
choose to participate in the fiscal insurance system,ZP 
Gordon and Varian [14) argue that young consumers in period c vill 
refuse cc participate in the fiscal insurance system whenever at < 0. 
Their modal assumes a constant population size so, for the moment, 
suppose that G I. To keep the argument simple, suppose that e, is a 
drawing from a finite set and let e < 0 be the minimum possible value of 
a, First, suppose that at -a, In this case, each young consumer is 
required to pay /2 in taxes. If in the following period, ecu in, 
then each generation t consumer would receive a fiscal subsidy of ,/2 end 
22 This analysis assumes that if a generation decides not to 
participate in the fiscal insurance system when it is young, then it is 
precluded from receiving panenta from a fiscal insurance system when it 
is old. Otherwise, if young consumers bedreved that the choice of 
whether or not to participate in the fiscal system when young would have 
no effect on whether they would receive payments when they were old, then 
young consumers would never choose to pay the fiscal insurance tax. 
thus would have consumption equal to w - , which is the same that 
consumption would have been without participating in the fiscal system. 
However, if in the following period, e+i > -, then the consumer will 
either receive a fiscal subsidy less than J2 or will pay a tax. Thus, 
the consumer will end up having paid more into the system than he or she 
got out of it. Therefore, the best that the young consumer can hope for 
is to-break even by participating in the system, and, in general, the 
consumer will be worse off cx post. Clearly, such a consumer will choose 
not to participate in the system in this case, 
The argument above establishes that if e -a, then the generation 
t consumers will not participate in the fiscal insurance system. Now 
suppose that there is some value e*  - such that the generation t 
consumer will choose to participate in the system if and only if e > e*. 
It is now straightforward to demonstrate, by contradiction, that e* 
cannot be negative. Suppose that e e* < 0. In this situation a young 
generation t consumer is required to pay e*j/2, ut how much will the 
consumer receive in the following period? If e+l < e*, then the 
generation t÷l consumers will not join the system, and hence the 
generation t consumer will receive nothing from the fiscal insurance 
system. If et+l > e*, then the generation t consumer will either receive 
a subsidy smaller than Ie*I/2 or will pay a taK. In either of these 
situations, the consumer is worse off for having participated in the 
fiscal insurance system. Only if e1 — e* will the generation t 
consumer end up as well off under the fiscal insurance system as without 
it. Thus, as above, the consumer cannot possibly be made better off by 
joining the fiscal insurance system and will, in general, he made worse 
off. Therefore, he or she will not join. Thus, e* cannot be negative. 
Gordon and Varian discuss mechanisms that would avoid the repeal of 
the intergenerational fiscal- ins'rance system. For example, if large 
enough costs are imposed on any young cohort that tries to repeal tha 
fiscal insurance system, then no generation will ever repeal the system, 
and,i equilibrium the costs will not have to be borne, For example, if 
the abandonment of the fiscal insurance system leads to economic or 
social upheaval, then the young generation may decide that the costs 
axceed any pecuniary gains from avoiding partiripation in the fiscal 
!nsurance system. 
In addition to the mechanisms discussed by Gordon and Varian for 
sustaining a fiscal insurance system, there is the possibility that 
population growth can sustain the system. If all generations have the 
same nuoher of consumers, then the size of the maximum transfer paid by a 
consumer is equal to the size of the maximum transfer that this 
consumer could possibly receive when old, Therefore, as argued above. 
when a young consumer is required to make the maximum possible transfec, 
the consumer cannot possibly expect to benefit from participating in the 
fiscal insurance system. However, if each generation is G times as large 
as the preceding generation, then the largest transfer that can be 
received by an old consumer is G times as large as the largest transfer 
that a young consumer could be required to make, Thus, even if a young 
consumer had to pay the largest possible transfer, it is still possible 
that the consumer could receive an even larger transfer in the following 
period. Depending on the consumer's attitude toward risk, it may turn 
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out that even faced with the largest required payment when young, the 
consumer would choose to participate in the fiscal insurance system. 
To demonstrate that population growth may be able to sustain 
voluntary participation in the fiscal insurance system, it may be clearer 
to use a numerical example than an algebraic proof. Suppose chat each 
generation is twice as large as the generation preceding it, i.e. , 0 2. 
In t,his case, it follows from (64) that an optimal fiscal insurance 
system will set r equal to 4/5. Substituting C 2 and r 4/5 into the 
equation for consumption (62) yields 
w + 0.4 e., 0.2 et÷1 (66) 
The value of consumption in (66) is based on the assumption that 
the fiscal insurance system remains intact, As an example, suppose that 
w 11 and that there are only three possible values for e: -10, 0, and 
10. Assume that e -10 and e 10 are equally probable and let q < 1/2 
denote this common probability. Therefore, the probability that e 0 i 
l-2q. Thus, since consumption, c+i, depends on e and e±i, there are 
nine possible value of c which are displayed in Table 1. Eaco row 
corresponds to a value of e and each column corresponds to a value ci 
e+l. 
Consider a young consumer in period t and suppose that et -10, cc 
that this young consumer is faced with paying the largest possible 
transfer. To determine whether this consumer will choose cc participate 
in the fiscal system, the values of consumption in the first row of Table 
1 must be compared with the values of c1 if the consumer does not 
participate in the system. These values are shown in Table 2. 
Comparing the values of consumption in the first row of Table 1 
with the values of consumption in Table 2, it is clear that neither row 
dominates the other in a stochastic dominance sense. By participating in 
the fiscal insurance system, the consumer reduces the variance of 
consumption from 200q to Sq at the cost of reducing the expected value of 
consumption from 11 to 7. Whether a consumer views the reduction in risk 
as sgoath the price depends on his or her attitude toward risk and on the 
value of q. Clearly the more aversion the consumer has to risk the note 
attractive is the fiscal insurance system. 
Suppose that the utility function is u(c) l000exp[-kc] whero k 
is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Assume that q 0.25. ii 
k I, then the expected utility if the consumer participates in the 
fiscal insurance system is -2,17; the expected utility if the consumer 
does not participate in the aystem is - 91.97. Thus, the system will ho 
sustained by voluntary participation is this case. 
In the example above, all generations voluntarily choose to 
rarticipate in the fiscal insurance. Secause all generations obtain 
higher utility with the introduction of the fiscal insurance system, such 
a system is Pareto-improving. In this particular example, the net rate 
of return on savings is zero, so that using the notation from section II, 
R 1. Therefore, in this example, R < C so that Golden Rule 
consideratioms indicate that a Pareto-improvement could be achieved by 
increasing consumption and reducing saving. The determination of the 
optimal fiscal system, which might include both an element of 
intergenerational risk sharing and an element of lump-sum 
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intergenerational transfers to stimulate consumption, remains an open 
question for research. 
V. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has analyzed the effects of various fiscal policies in 
situations in which individual consumers face various sorts of risks. 
Metoologically, the research presented in this paper is quite 
neoclassical Although the models employed in this paper are very much 
in the spirit of those embraced by the so-called new classical school of 
macroeconomics, the results differ quite dramatically from some of the 
most well-known new classical results. In particular, the Ricarian 
Equivalence Theorem, which essentially states that lump-sum tax policies 
have no effect is an important result that pervades much of the new 
classical literature. The results reported in this paper often deviate 
importantly from the RLcardian Equivalence Theorem. The departures from 
the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem, and hence the effects of fiscal 
policy, depend importantly on the availability and the nature of 
insurance arrangements to protect individual consumers against various 
types of risk. It is perhaps ironic that the traditional Keynesian 
model, which emphasizes the effects of fiscal policy, has no place for 
insurance arrangements to interact with fiscal policy. it is in the 
neoclassical framework, which is based on the optimizing behavior of 
consumers facing risk, that the interattion of insurance and fiscal 
policy becomes apparent, Further research into the nature and evolution 
of insurance arrangements will help to extend understanding of the 
effects of fiscal policy. 
6 
Table 1 
Values of under the fiscal insurance system 
l0 0 10 
e's 
l0 5 7 9 
0 9 11 13 
10 13 15 17 
Table 2 
Values of 
°t+l in absence of fiscal 
insurance 
e1: l0 0 10 
ct÷l: 1 11 21 
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